Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts

By M. Tye. 2008

204 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1cbd20caedd04cb75d76c3f87da1a7037a9fca39

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Katalin Balog
2. Manolo Martínez

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

1. Katalin Balog
2. Manolo Martínez

In Social Psychology

1. Katalin Balog
2. Manolo Martínez

Citations in the corpus

• Acquaintance and the mind-body problem (2012, background): “…to one’s conscious experience, one is aware only of the representational content of the experience, or alternatively, only of features of the objects perceived, and conclude from this that qualia, i.e., intrinsic, qualitative, introspectable features of 15 For a denial of this claim see Tye (2009).”
• Imperative content and the painfulness of pain (2011, methodology): “According to what Tye (2009b) calls strong representationalism, for example, what we feel just is what gets represented in the experience: real-world sandness.”