What Conditional Probability Could Not Be

By Alan Hájek. Synthese, 2003

345 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1c260244f3766be32c459ecc6b701cfda03e8b6f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

1. Nate Charlow
2. Elliott Sober

In History and Philosophy of Science

1. Nate Charlow
2. Elliott Sober
3. David Posada
4. T. Buckley

In Philosophy

1. Nate Charlow
2. Elliott Sober

Citations in the corpus

• Triviality for restrictor conditionals (2016, background): “|P) is not in fact Normalized to s(w) ∩ P. 25 Considerations in favor of primitive conditional probability are reviewed in Hájek (2003); Weisberg (2011).”
• Evolutionary Theory and the Reality of Macro-Probabilities (2010, background): “This mistake leads to the pseudo-problem of trying to figure out what that one true probability is. The grip of this misconception can be broken by taking conditional probability, rather than unconditional probability, as one’s fundamental concept ( Hajek 2003 ).”
• Non-Archimedean Probability (2011, neutral): “[17, 12]).”