External Networking and Internal Firm Governance

By Cesare Fracassi, Geoffrey A. Tate. 2012

937 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1c0f1099c6e96f3f6249cc13e25c785f2d5efa8a

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In Accounting

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

Friends with Money (2012, positive): “BoardEx has been used to examine the role of social networks in a variety of corporate finance settings (e.g., Schmidt, 2008; Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2008; Fracassi and Tate, 2009).”
The role of investment banker directors in M&A (2014, neutral): “Another commonly used exogenous shock to address the endogeneity of board composition is the death of directors, because director exits due to death are unlikely to be correlated with firm policies (Bennedsen, PerezGonzalez, and Wolfenzon, 2011; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Fracassi, 2012).”
Ethnic matching in the U.S. venture capital market (2015, positive): “Another set of findings, however, suggests that social ties based on university affiliation can be detrimental: it can worsen corporate governance (Nguyen, 2012) and is associated with lower market valuations (Fracassi and Tate, 2012).”
How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions (2019, neutral): “socially connected to the CEO (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Fracassi and Tate, 2012) and who have a”
Executive Networks and Firm Policies: Evidence from the Random Assignment of MBA Peers (2013, neutral): “14Fracassi and Tate (2011) find related evidence that firms with more CEO-director connections make more frequent acquisitions, which destroy shareholder value on average.”
Corporate Finance Policies and Social Networks (2017, neutral): “Fracassi and Tate (2008) finds that socially powerful CEOs hire directors that are more socially connected with them, and that leads to weaker monitoring, with more value-destroying mergers and less company-prompted restatements.”