The Relation Between Insider‐Trading Restrictions and Executive Compensation

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Disclosure Tone and Shareholder Litigation (2011, background): “1 For example, firms implement insider trading blackout windows (Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon 2000; Roulstone 2003) and 10b5-1 trading plans (Jagolinzer 2009) to reduce litigation risks.”
Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading (2016, unknown): “The coefficient estimates on control variables are consistent with those reported in Roulstone (2003).”
What Insiders Know About Future Earnings and How They Use it: Evidence from Insider Trades (2003, background): “In a situation where one would expect regulatory scrutiny, Seyhun and Bradley (1997) find no trades by executives in the 30 days prior to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing.”
Corporate Governance and Blockchains (2017, unknown): “See Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) and Roulstone (2003), who provides an explanation, rooted in the theories of Manne (1966), for why insider trading, whether legal or illegal, may represent an effective incentive system that alings managers’ and shareholders’ interests.”
The informational contribution of social and environmental disclosures for investors (2010, unknown): “More specifically, Roulstone (2003) documents results that are consistent with analysts reducing information asymmetry by providing public information to market participants, while there is no support for analyst following functioning as a proxy for privately held information.”