The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence from Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals

By Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, Dilip Mookherjee, Sujata Visaria. 2010

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Citations in the corpus

Enlarging the Contracting Space: Collateral Menus, Access to Credit, and Economic Activity (2016, unknown): “, 1997), recent studies show that reforms boosting creditors’ powers often lead to less — not more — credit taking (Lilienfeld-Toal et al., 2012; and Vig, 2013).”
Do Debt Contract Enforcement Costs Affect Financing and Asset Structure (2014, unknown): “The identification strategy in our paper is similar to that employed by both Visaria (2009) and Lilienfeld et al. (2012), although the question tackled is completely different. While Visaria (2009) studies the effect of DRTs on borrower delinquency and loan interest rates, Lilienfeld et al.”
Court Enforcement and Firm Productivity: Evidence from a Bankruptcy Reform in Brazil (2013, unknown): “…Indian bank, Visaria (2009) finds that the introduction of specialized tribunals increases loan repayment and lowers the cost of credit for firms.5 Lilienfeld-Toal et al. (2012) use Indian data to show theoretically and empirically that when credit supply is inelastic, the existence of…”