Who Gets Credit? The Behavior of Bureaucrats and State Banks in Allocating Credit to Chinese State-owned Enterprises

By Robert J. Cull, Lixin Colin Xu. 2003

421 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1b013fb509232717c5e5b6cdbad5e2227ff67601

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Citations in the corpus

Inside the Black Box: Bank Credit Allocation in China’s Private Sector (2009, background): “Managerial incentive contracts can alleviate moral hazard problems, reduce agency costs, induce managers to maximize firm value and thus reduce the credit default risk (Cull and Xu, 2003).”
Are New Tigers supplanting Old Mammoths in China's banking system? Evidence from a sample of city commercial banks (2009, background): “Cull and Xu (2000) detect signs of SOCB loans going more and more to unproductive SOEs during the 1990s, when these banks increasingly assumed bailout responsibility (Cull and Xu, 2003).”
Anti-Corruption Reforms and Shareholder Valuations: Event Study Evidence from China (2016, positive): “For example, SOEs have preferential access to bank loans, the dominant form of financing in China (Cull and Xu, 2003; Allen et al., 2005).”
Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, background): “Literature shows that Chinese family firms are discriminated against for accessing external financial resources (Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2013), so connected executives help to overcome this discrimination.”
Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment : evidence from China (2008, background): “Cull and Xu (2003) find that state banks have grown increasingly inefficient in allocating credit since the mid-1990s as they have been increasingly forced to bail out poorly performing SOEs.”
Bank financing and corporate governance (2015, neutral): “E-mail addresses: meijun@nus.edu.sg (M. j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j c o r p f i n other hand, private firms are still being discriminated against in formal financing (Allen et al., 2005; Cull and Xu, 2003; Cull et al., 2009, etc).”
The Roles of Bank and Trade Credits: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Evidence (2014, background): “…researchers also inspected the development of trade credit in China and concluded that trade credit is an important informal credit channel and is regarded as the substitute credit channel for private sector ﬁrms with bank lending constraints (Allen et al. 2005, Cull and Xu 2003, Ge and Qiu 2007).”
Financial development, bank discrimination and trade credit (2007, background): “Cull and Xu (2003) studied the determinants of credit allocation among the state firms.”
Ownership, Investment Climate and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Firms (2006, neutral): “…enterprises, and the general lack of confidence that the Chinese state-owned banking sector does a good job in allocating bank loans (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2004; Cull and Xu, 2000, 2003), it is unlikely that we shall find a strong positive contribution of the banking sector to firm performance.”