Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance Through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries

By Eric Bartelsman, R. Beetsma. Social Science Research Network, 2003

526 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper presents evidence of profit shifting in response to differences in corporate tax rates for a large selection of OECD countries. In our estimates we control for the effects of tax rate changes on real activity. Our baseline estimates suggest that, on average, a unilateral increase in the corporate tax rate does not lead to an increase in corporate tax revenues owing to a more than offsetting decline in reported profits.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1aeb848c70481a4d323dc112722a98613009a40a

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Citations in the corpus

Should countries control international profit shifting (2006, background): “u(L,L)∗ ≥ H 1 (1) and U (L,L)∗ ≥ H (L,L) 2 (1).”
Transfer Pricing by U.S.-Based Multinational Firms (2008, unknown): “14See, for example, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), who look at income shifting among OECD countries.”
Saving Taxes Through Foreign Plant Ownership (2010, unknown): “parametric endogenous treatment efiect estimator (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Angrist, 1998; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd; 1997, 1998; Rosenbaum, 2002; Rubin, 2006; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith,”
Multinationals' Profit Response to Tax Differentials: Effect Size and Shifting Channels (2017, unknown): “5 Excluded studies are, for example, Grubert and Mutti (1991), Jacob (1996), Grubert (1998), Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), and Clausing (2003).”
Profit shifting in the EU: evidence from Germany (2009, unknown): “Like in Hines and Rice, they 4 U.S. studies using mostly smaller firm samples include Klassen, Lang and Wolfson (1993), Jacob (1996), Collins and Shackelford (1998), and Rousslang (1997) 5 A recent study that uses a quite different approach is by Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003).”
Tax Competition When Firms Choose Their Organizational Form: Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals Be Closed? (2005, background): “4 Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003, Table 1) give details – based on information collected by Ernst & Young – on the formal enforcement of transfer pricing rules in 16 OECD countries. This comparison documents substantial international differences in the enforcement of transfer pricing rules and their e”
Offshore Profit Shifting and Domestic Productivity Measurement (2017, background): “5See, for example, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), Clausing (2003), Grubert and Mutti (1991), and Hines and Rice (1994).”
Earnings Shocks and Tax-Motivated Income-Shifting: Evidence from European Multinationals (2012, unknown): “While Swenson's study finds only small effects, Clausing (2003) and Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) report substantial responses of transfer prices to corporate taxes.”
Knocking on Tax Haven’s Door: Multinational Firms and Transfer Pricing (2017, background): “8 Bartelsman & Beetsma (2003) use aggregated data on value added across manufacturing sectors in the OECD.”