In defense of moral testimony

By P. Sliwa. Philosophical Studies, 2012

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Moral testimony has been getting a bad name in the recent literature. It has been argued that while testimony is a perfectly fine source for nonmoral belief, there’s something wrong with basing one’s moral beliefs on it. This paper argues that the bad name is undeserved: Moral testimony isn’t any more problematic than nonmoral testimony. Some people claim that there is something intuitively problematic about deferring to others for one’s moral beliefs: there seems to be something valuable about coming to one’s moral beliefs by oneself. Hills, argues for example:

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1a9652087b2801e9f8e3e45941bd327a128ab600