General versus Specific Skills in Labor Markets with Search Frictions and Firing Costs

By Étienne Wasmer. 2006

257 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1a5ce23097243220b066ac420b6c86c48a41ac6a

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Temporary Employment, Job Flows and Productivity: A Tale of Two Reforms (2012, unknown): “High EPL hampers the reallocation of workers and jobs across industries and rms by inducing substitution of speci c for general skills (Wasmer, 2006); reduces workers e¤ort (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Riphahn and Engellandt, 2005; Dolado et al., 2012); reduces the undertaking of highly productive…”
Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States (2007, unknown): “Agell (1999) discusses why eliminating dismissal protections may not be desirable when labor markets are subject to fairness considerations and market imperfections, while Wasmer (2006) and Macleod and Nakavachara (2006) focus on human capital investment.”
Local social capital and geographical mobility (2010, background): “See Hassler et al. (2000, 2005), Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998, 2002), Bertola and Ichino (1995), Wasmer (2006) and Bertola and Rogerson (1997) for more on these alternative or complementary explanations.”
Characterising green employment: The impacts of ‘greening’ on workforce composition (2018, background): “Wasmer (2006) finds that economies with job-specific skills do well in the absence of shocks but face high transition costs.”
Firm‐Specific Human Capital: A Skill‐Weights Approach (2009, result): “14 This result is similar to that of Wasmer (2006), who shows that as markets become more competitive, investment becomes less firm specific.”
Who Pays for It? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation (2013, unknown): “Moreover, stricter EPL may raise rms incentives to invest in training, thereby fostering the accumulation of rm-speci c human capital and increasing both productivity and wages (Autor et al., 2003; Wasmer, 2006; Cingano et al., 2010).”
Firm Market Power and the Earnings Distribution (2015, background): “In fact, Wasmer (2006) concludes that markets with substantial search frictions induce workers to overinvest in rm speci c human capital.”
The Effect of Employment Protection Legislation and Financial Market Imperfections on Investment: Evidence from a Firm-Level Panel of EU Countries (2009, unknown): “Wasmer (2006) suggests that by inducing substitution of specific for general skills, firing restrictions may have a negative effect on productivity when workers need to be reallocated across industries and industry-specific skills become useless.”
Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity? Evidence from US States (2007, unknown): “Agell (1999) discusses why eliminating dismissal protection may not be desirable when labour markets are subject to fairness considerations and market imperfections, while Wasmer (2006) and Macleod and Nakavachara (2007) focus on human capital investment.”