Resolving the debate on innate ideas: Learnability constraints and the evolved interpenetration of motivational and conceptual functions
By J. Tooby, L. Cosmides, H. Clark Barrett. 2005
92 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1a1c81b08e482a1566555edb46810e327a304373
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Jesse Graham
- Ravi Iyer
- Matt Motyl
- Jonathan Haidt
- L. Penke
- Spassena P. Koleva
- Robert Kurzban
- J. Tooby
Citations in the corpus
- Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism (2012, methodology): “Nobody in psychology today argues that the human mind is truly a “blank slate” at birth, but opinions range widely from minimalist positions, which say that there is hardly any writing on the “first draft” of the mind, to maximalist positions such as massive modularity (Sperber, 2005; Tooby et al., ”
- Modularity in cognition: framing the debate. (2006, background): “There exist various versions of the massive modularity claim, with some claiming that there is substantial modularity in central systems but allowing for some nonmodular processes, and others claiming that the mind is modular " all the way down " (Sperber, 1994; see also Tooby et al., 2005).”
- The Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology (2015, background): “Yet, there are strong reasons to doubt that a system of this kind would track fitness at all (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Tooby et al., 2005).”
- The evolutionary genetics of personality (2007, background): “This relieves us from the impossible task of learning our most basic behavioural dispositions de novo every generation (Barrett, 2006; Figueredo et al., 2006; Tooby et al., 2005).”