Direct proofs of generic finiteness of nash equilibrium outcomes

By Srihari Govindan, Robert B. Wilson. 2001

56 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1982542c1f579afb1d805762448f6ed94aae63cb

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Robert B. Wilson
2. Srihari Govindan
3. Ulrich Doraszelski
4. Juan F. Escobar
5. Kevin Leyton-Brown
6. Dimitris J. Bertsimas
7. Michele Aghassi
8. Jan De Loecker

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Robert B. Wilson
2. Srihari Govindan
3. Ulrich Doraszelski
4. Juan F. Escobar
5. Kevin Leyton-Brown
6. Michele Aghassi
7. Dimitris J. Bertsimas

Citations in the corpus

• A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria (2003, methodology): “In a companion paper (Govindan and Wilson, 2001a) we present another algorithm based on polymatrix approximation of the payo® function.”
• A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification (2008, background): “Corollary 3 generalizes an observation made by Govindan and Wilson (2001) for normal form games to dynamic stochastic games.”