Mechanisms and natural kinds
By Carl F. Craver. 2009
228 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: History and Philosophy of Science, Molecular Biology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/17f78075e5eeacc9ca64d20ba63e5295f8aeeec6
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In History and Philosophy of Science
In Molecular Biology
Citations in the corpus
- Predicting the Past from Minimal Traces: Episodic Memory and its Distinction from Imagination and Preservation (2020, background): “…mechanism – according to the standard view – is individuated solely by its components, their activities and their regular interactions with each other (Craver 2009; Machamer et al. 2000), and not in terms of representational content or the aim to approximate truth.16 We can summarize that…”
- Physical computation : a mechanistic account (2015, unknown): “Just like in the case of mechanisms (Craver 2009; Colombo et al. 2015), human perspectives and conventions will enter into judgements about how computational systems should be typed and individuated on a causal account.”
- The Nature of Dynamical Explanation* (2011, background): “Carl Craver (2007, 2009) has recently explored the question of how scientists determine the boundaries of mechanisms and has argued that they do so not via considerations of spatial proximity or between-component interactivity but “by reference to the phenomenon that the mechanism explains” (Craver…”
- Explanation in Biology: Reduction, Pluralism, and Explanatory Aims (2011, unknown): “Any system can be decomposed into smaller units in different ways, but a mechanistic explanation usually chooses one decomposition only (Craver 2009; Winther 2006).”