Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value

By Bennett W. Helm. 2001

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Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation (2007, background): “Most philosophers accept that a theory of emotion, although it must not reduce emotion to feeling, has to account for the fact that emotions are by their nature felt states (cf., e.g. Goldie 2000; Nussbaum 2001; Helm 2001; Döring and Peacocke 2002; Roberts 2003).”
Emotions as Evaluative Feelings (2009, background): “This suggests, as I have argued elsewhere (Helm, 2001, especially chap.”
Affective intentionality and the feeling body (2008, background): “The felt 15 This account of hedonic valence is in line with the anti-foundationalist conception of “felt evaluations” developed by Bennett Helm (cf. Helm 2001, esp. ch. 2 and 3; 2002). body is the “sounding board” (to use William James’ term) of things affecting you adversely or favourably.”