Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value

By R. Aumann, Roger B. Myerson. 2003

301 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1730fc7baf9e1f261b12794e5ea183046d383891

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Citations in the corpus

An Overview of Social Networks and Economic Applications (2011, background): “Examples of individual choice of relationships also emerged in the cooperative game theory literature, including the formation of a graph in a context where the network of connections would impact the structure of the cooperative game and thus ultimately the payoffs of different agents, as studied b”
Chapter 53 The shapley value (2002, methodology): “An interesting application of Myerson’s solution was proposed by Aumann and Myerson (1988). They considered an extensive form game in which players propose links to other players, sequentially.”
The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions (2003, background): “Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) examine stable and efficient social networks in a link formation game, in which players form coalitions by linking with other players.”
The Economics of Social Networks (2005, background): “Aumann and Myerson (1988) then recognized that di¤erent graph structures led to di¤erent allocations of value to the agents in the society, and so they studied a speci c extensive form game where links are considered one-by-one according to some exogenous order, and formed if both agents involved…”
The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks (2002, background): “Aumann and Myerson [1988] were the first to take an explicit look at network formation in a strategic context where individuals had discretion over their connections; these connections defined a communication structure that was applied to a cooperative game. Slikker and van den Nouweland [1997] have”
Structural holes in social networks (2007, background): “thus inducing the payoff function specified in (1).”
Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey (2004, methodology): “Subsequent models include Aumann and Myerson (1988) , Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998), Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000) and Johnson and Gilles (2000).”
Network formation and social coordination (2005, unknown): “…earlier work on network formation it is assumed that the sole concern of players is whom they connect to—i.e. the only strategic considerations are associated to their linking decisions (see, e.g., Aumann and Myerson, 1989; Bala and Goyal, 2000; Dutta et al., 1995; and Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).”
Rational Expectations and Farsighted Stability (2017, background): “This is a direction of research that has attracted renewed interest; see, for example, Harsanyi (1974), Aumann and Myerson (1988), Chwe (1994), Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999), Xue (1998), Diamantoudi and Xue (2003), Konishi and Ray (2003), Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004), Herings et al.…”