Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices
By Daniel Gottesman, Hoi-Kwong Lo, Norbert Lutkenhaus, John Preskill. International Symposium onInformation Theory, 2004. ISIT 2004. Proceedings., 2002
939 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This paper prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. This proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. The estimation of the key generation rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/16fc3a4b4650a5fe531d467304e4287a92db1999
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Citations in the corpus
- Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices (2020, methodology): “The main idea of the GLLP security analysis is that if Alice and Bob employ linear privacy amplification, such as the matrix hashing introduced in Section III.”
- Field test of quantum key distribution in the Tokyo QKD Network. (2011, background): “Progress has also been made in theory, not only developing new tools to prove protocols themselves but also analyzing the security of practical QKD systems [2,3].”
- Quantum key distribution with entangled photon sources (2007, methodology): “We remark that in Koashi and Preskill’s security proof, the squash model [13] is applied.”
- Secure quantum key distribution (2014, background): “In fact, as mentioned before, source flaws can be taken care off in security proofs [26, 92].”