Leader Behavior and the Natural Resource Curse

By Francesco Caselli, Tom Cunningham. 2009

209 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Building and Construction, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/16d25b192ffa9ce8615e1bad0405f4160d309bbe

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Citations in the corpus

Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has it Proven so Difficult? (2016, background): “Resource rents alter the leader’s probability of staying in power, and hence the economic, political, and j_venables_301.indd 174 1/20/16 7:00 AM Anthony J. Venables 175 military strategies that are pursued (Caselli and Cunningham 2009).”
Oil and political survival (2013, background): “2See Caselli and Cunningham (2009) for a systematic review over how political leadership incentives may be in uenced by natural resources, Robinson et al. (2006) and Robinson and Torvik (2005) for di¤erent forms of strategic spending, and Ross (2001, 2008) for an overview of the so-called rentier…”
Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? (2011, background): “of law or infrastructure, so the effects of resources on economic performance can be highly non-monotonic (Caselli and Cunningham, 2009).”
An Empirical Growth Model for Major Oil Exporters (2012, unknown): “The recent theoretical work of Caselli and Cunningham (2009) is not conclusive either and, perhaps not surprisingly, can yield outcomes that are not compatible with the resource curse hypothesis.”
Oil Exports and the Iranian Economy (2013, unknown): “1 Some of these considerations have been recently formalized by Caselli and Cunningham (2009) where they attempt to characterize conditions under which an increase in the size of the resource rent leads to a decrease in real output, the so called "natural resource curse" hypothesis.”
Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Government (2013, background): “…of leaders by increasing the value of holding office, thereby incentivizing them to invest in internal security (a repression mechanism) or to buy support through spending on goods or patronage (a spending mechanism) (Caselli and Cunningham 2009; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006; Ross 2001).”
The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability (2013, methodology): “I build on a simple two-period framework developed by Caselli and Cunningham (2009), where leader utility is partially determined by a survival function, i.e. the reduced-form probability of retaining power.5 This is consistent with Robinson et al (2006) resource booms increase the value of staying…”
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource Abundance, Dependence and the Onset of Civil Wars (2009, background): “On conflict, refer to Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), Collier et al. (2007), Ross (2004a,b), Lujala (2005), and to the special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution devoted to the topic. On regime type (and institutions more broadly), refer to Ross (2001), Leite and Weidmann (2002), Jensen ”
Growth, Development and Natural Resources: New Evidence Using a Heterogeneous Panel Analysis (2011, unknown): “We refer to Sachs and Warner (1995), Rosser (2006), and Caselli and Cunningham (2009) for an extensive examination of these prominent accounts of the natural resource curse paradox, as well as van der Ploeg and Venables (2009) for a more recent survey.”
Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability (2016, unknown): “We abstract from these issues in order to get simple results, but see Caselli and Cunningham (2009) and Tsui (2010) for a detailed discussion.9”
Is Natural Resource Abundance a Stimulus for Financial Development in the USA (2017, background): “Weak political and financial institutions, neglected education, Dutch disease, failures of economic policy and rent seeking are the main causes of negative economic growth in resource rich countries (Sachs and Warner 1995, Rosser 2006, Caselli and Cunningham 2009, van der Ploeg and Venables 2009). I”