The Impact of Property Rights on Households’ Investment, Risk Coping, and Policy Preferences: Evidence from China*
By K. Deininger, Songqing Jin. Economic development and cultural change, 2002
134 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Even though it is widely recognized that giving farmers more secure land rights may increase agricultural investment, scholars contend that, in the case of China, such a policy might undermine the function of land as a social safety net and, as a consequence, not be sustainable or command broad support. Data from three provinces, one of which had adopted a policy to increase security of tenure in advance of the others, suggest that greater tenure security, especially if combined with transferability of land, had a positive impact on agricultural investment and, within the time frame considered, led neither to an increase in inequality of land distribution nor a reduction in households' ability to cope with exogenous shocks. Household support for more secure property rights is increased by their access to other insurance mechanisms, suggesting some role of land as a safety net. At the same time, past exposure to this type of land right has a much larger impact quantitatively, suggesting that a large part of the resistance to changed property rights arrangements disappears as household familiarity with such rights increases.
Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Soil Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1594e418c7e991bcf4b628709645f82a7ee7fdfa
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In Political Science and International Relations
- E. Lichtenberg
- Cheng Ding
- Andreas Kontoleon
- Pauline Grosjean
- K. Deininger
- Songqing Jin
- K. Otsuka
- Scott Rozelle
In Soil Science
- Songqing Jin
- K. Deininger
- E. Lichtenberg
- K. Otsuka
- Cheng Ding
- Scott Rozelle
- Andreas Kontoleon
- Pauline Grosjean
Citations in the corpus
- The impact of land property rights interventions on investment and agricultural productivity in developing countries: a systematic review (2017, unknown): “…(Deininger & Chamorro , 2004) Peru 1992/3−2004 (RE synthesis) Peru 1992−2004 (Fort, 2008) Peru 1993−2004 (Torrero & Field, 2005) China 1987−2001 (Deininger & Jin, 2002) Ethiopia 2003−2006/7 (RE synthesis) Ethiopia 2003−2007 (Deininger et al., 2007) Ethiopia 2003−2006 (Deininger et al.,…”
- Efficiency of Land Allocation through Tenancy Markets: Evidence from China (2011, background): “Li, Rozelle, and Brandt (1998), Brandt et al. (2002), Jacoby, Li, and Rozzelle (2002), and Deininger and Jin (2003) argue that such land reallocations have created a perception of land tenure insecurity for farm households.”
- Assessing farmland protection policy in China (2008, methodology): “An econometric study conducted by Deininger and Jin (2003) using more recent (2001) data from villages in Guizhou, Hunan, and Yunnan Provinces found that farmers in villages with a policy of no land readjustments for population changes were more likely to invest, and invested more, in agricultural…”
- The potential of land rental markets in the process of economic development: Evidence from China (2005, background): “These provinces are characterized by significant differences in tenure rules and the length of time for which use rights are assigned but also the extent of out-migration (Deininger and Jin, 2003).”
- Relaxing rural constraints: a ‘win-win’ policy for poverty and environment in China? (2010, background): “In particular, Deininger and Jin (2002, 2003) point to failures in the market for land as the cause of ine¢ cient agricultural practices in a number of provinces of China, while Feng et al (2004) highlight limited o¤-farm opportunities and grain shortages as the main motivation for the cultivation…”
- Land Tenure Arrangements and Rural-Urban Migration in China (2011, background): “For example, Kung and Liu (1997) find that 70% of their surveyed sample of 800 households had experienced reallocations since the 15 year contracts were introduced, and Deininger and Jin (2003) find that 80% of villages experienced one or more reallocations between 1983 and 1990.”