The Political Resource Curse
By David Wiens, Paul Poast, W. Clark. 2014
514 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Extant theoretical work on the political resource curse implies that dependence on resource revenues should decrease autocracies’ likelihood of democratizing but not necessarily affect democracies’ chances of survival. Yet most previous empirical studies estimate models that are ill-suited to address this claim. We improve upon previous studies, estimating a dynamic logit model using data from 166 countries, covering the period from 1816 to 2006. We find that an increase in resource dependence decreases an autocracy’s likelihood of being democratic over both the short term and long term but has no appreciable effect on democracies’ likelihood of persisting.
Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/156efd7e923339224c470464171272650cffa844
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In Economics and Econometrics
Citations in the corpus
- Rooting Out Corruption or Rooting for Corruption? The Heterogeneous Electoral Consequences of Scandals* (2015, result): “2 More recent studies that dispute part of the mechanism have obtained smaller estimates using the same data (Brollo 2008; Brollo et al. 2013).”
- Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil (2018, unknown): “Our data on public procurement and service delivery irregularities are non-public and serve as the basis for the published audit reports used in Ferraz and Finan (2010), Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (2012), and Litschig and Zamboni (2012).”
- The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State When it Tries to Tax Them* (2020, unknown): “corrupt and spend more on public goods when taxes comprise a greater share of total revenues (Brollo et al. 2013; Gadenne 2017; Martinez 2019).”
- The extractive industries and development: The resource curse at the micro, meso and macro levels (2015, unknown): “…revenues become inefficiently allocated (based on rent-seeking rather than expected returns) often with lower-quality politicians in public office (Brollo et al., 2013), governments adopt short-sighted policies given the volatility of prices and revenues and there are limited controls that…”
- Intergovernmental Grants as Signals and the Alignment Effect: Theory and Evidence (2015, unknown): “One exception is Brollo et al. (2013), which shows howhigher grants from central governments can have negative effects on the behavior of lower-level governments in that the higher the transfer, the greater the rent taken by the lowerlevel incumbent, and when entry of incumbents is endogenized, the…”
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- The Impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on Education Outcomes and Poverty Reduction (2013, unknown): “8 Note that for the political selection mechanism proposed by Brollo et al. (2013) to explain the electoral effect we find, the receipt of extra transfers (and associated rents) would have to have occurred after the election, with the candidates being fully aware of which municipalities would receiv”
- Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money go? (2015, unknown): “Brollo et al. (2013) study the impact of an increase in federal transfers in Brazil on political corruption and on the quality of candidates.”