Veto Players and the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies
By J. Andrews, Gabriella R. Montinola. 2004
141 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Law
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/151e782eee5158d99199371a377ce5deb1d29c6f
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Citations in the corpus
- Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India (2016, background): “1 Scholars with a Weberian view of bureaucracy are skeptical that increased political oversight will improve outcomes (Knott and Miller 2006), preferring restrictions on political interference on the bureaucracy (Andrews and Montinola 2004; Falaschetti and Miller 2001).”
- Political institutions and developmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa (2004, background): “For a recent study that finds similar institutional effects on the rule of law in developing countries, see Andrews & Montinola 2004.”