The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard With Envious Agents
By Björn Bartling, Ferdinand A. von Siemens. 2010
159 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/14865d4fa5a331d9e09566af26dcfe88ad7f0066
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Marie-Claire Villeval
- Emma Hubert
- Gary Charness
- David Masclet
- Stephen Leider
- Romuald Elie
- Thibaut Mastrolia
- Dylan Possamaï
In Safety Research
- Marie-Claire Villeval
- David Masclet
- Emma Hubert
- Gary Charness
- Stephen Leider
- Florian Englmaier
- Romuald Elie
- Thibaut Mastrolia
In Sociology and Political Science
- Emma Hubert
- Gary Charness
- David Masclet
- Stephen Leider
- Florian Englmaier
- Romuald Elie
- Marie-Claire Villeval
- Thibaut Mastrolia
Citations in the corpus
- The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2014, background): “The “tie in performance” variable equals 1 if i’s initial performance is identical to j’s performance, and 0 otherwise.”
- Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management (2019, methodology): “We refer the reader to the most notable works in this direction, among which we can find Bartling and von Siemens (2010), Demougin, Fluet, and Helm (2006), Demski & Sappington (1984), Green and Stokey (1983), Grund and Sliwka (2005), Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982), Holmström (1982), Itoh (2004),…”
- Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents (2008, background): “Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Managers Have Variable Pay 0.”