Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?

By Anna Alexandrova. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2016

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Well–being, health and freedom are some of the many phenomena of interest to science whose definitions rely on a normative standard. Empirical generalizations about them thus present a special case of value-ladenness. I propose the notion of a ‘mixed claim’ to denote such generalizations. Against the prevailing wisdom, I argue that we should not seek to eliminate them from science. Rather, we need to develop principles for their legitimate use. Philosophers of science have already reconciled values with objectivity in several ways, but none of the existing proposals are suitable for mixed claims. Using the example of the science of well-being, I articulate a conception of objectivity for this science and for mixed claims in general. 1 Introduction 2 What Are Mixed Claims? 3 Mixed Claims Are Different   3.1 Values as reasons to pursue science   3.2 Values as agenda-setters   3.3 Values as ethical constraints on research protocols   3.4 Values as arbiters between underdetermined theories   3.5 Values as determinants of standards of confirmation   3.6 Values as sources of wishful thinking and fraud 4 Mixed Claims Should Stay   4.1 Against Nagel 5 The Dangers of Mixed Claims 6 The Existing Accounts of Objectivity   6.1 The perils of impartiality 7 Objectivity for Mixed Claims 8 Three Rules   8.1 Unearth the value presuppositions in methods and measures   8.2 Check if value presuppositions are invariant to disagreements   8.3 Consult the relevant parties 9 Conclusion 1 Introduction 2 What Are Mixed Claims? 3 Mixed Claims Are Different   3.1 Values as reasons to pursue science   3.2 Values as agenda-setters   3.3 Values as ethical constraints on research protocols   3.4 Values as arbiters between underdetermined theories   3.5 Values as determinants of standards of confirmation   3.6 Values as sources of wishful thinking and fraud   3.1 Values as reasons to pursue science   3.2 Values as agenda-setters   3.3 Values as ethical constraints on research protocols   3.4 Values as arbiters between underdetermined theories   3.5 Values as determinants of standards of confirmation   3.6 Values as sources of wishful thinking and fraud 4 Mixed Claims Should Stay   4.1 Against Nagel   4.1 Against Nagel 5 The Dangers of Mixed Claims 6 The Existing Accounts of Objectivity   6.1 The perils of impartiality   6.1 The perils of impartiality 7 Objectivity for Mixed Claims 8 Three Rules   8.1 Unearth the value presuppositions in methods and measures   8.2 Check if value presuppositions are invariant to disagreements   8.3 Consult the relevant parties   8.1 Unearth the value presuppositions in methods and measures   8.2 Check if value presuppositions are invariant to disagreements   8.3 Consult the relevant parties 9 Conclusion

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Health Professions, History and Philosophy of Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/145bbe58940160de367ac50623a60fb80e06e101