Unraveling inner experiences during resting state
By J. Fell. 2013
12 citations recorded by the source corpus.
The investigation of resting state activity has become an extremely busy topic in neurocognitive research. A recent pubmed search revealed more than 2000 entries for the terms “resting state” AND “fMRI.” Several putative clinical applications have been suggested, such as the detection of early signs of Alzheimer's disease (e.g., Lustig et al., 2003) or risk of developing psychosis (e.g., Jukuri et al., 2013). However, the usefulness of resting state data is hampered by the fact, that up to now only very few investigations have tried to elucidate the mental processes occurring during these experiments. Without knowledge of these processes the purely physiologically based findings of altered activations and functional connectivities during resting state lack a meaningful neurocognitive interpretation.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Neuroscience, Cognitive Science & Psychology
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
In Neuroscience
In Cognitive Science & Psychology
- Ben Alderson-Day
- Charles Fernyhough
- R. T. Hurlburt
- Simone Kühn
- Simon McCarthy-Jones
- E. Meins
- Christopher Jarrold
- David M Williams
Citations in the corpus
- Inner Speech: Development, Cognitive Functions, Phenomenology, and Neurobiology (2015, background): “A perennial problem for neuroimaging research has been how to tie data on neural activations in the scanner to subjective assessments of experience (Fell, 2013).”
- Inner experience in the scanner: can high fidelity apprehensions of inner experience be integrated with fMRI? (2014, background): “…undermines the immediacy of the sampling method, because self-reporting on experience after a delay may be subject to a range of reporting biases (Fell, 2013) and is likely to reflect presuppositions about the experience rather than direct apprehensions of experiential phenomena (Hurlburt, 2011).”