Controlling shareholders, board structure, and firm performance: Evidence from India ☆
By M. Jameson, Andrew K. Prevost, John Puthenpurackal. 2014
155 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/141852da0098de70284060b77929267ecdd00c99
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In Accounting
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Citations in the corpus
- Firm performance, corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan (2018, methodology): “Recently, Jameson, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014) report similar average board size of eight for Indian firms.”
- Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, unknown): “Friedman et al. (2003); Su et al. (2008); Jameson et al. (2014) echo similar views and reported that, controlling shareholders are more prone to extract private rent and maximize their utility at the expense of minority shareholders in emerging country setting.”