Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy.

By Francesco Giovannoni. 2004

546 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/12c33d1a1b6d81c0a82c8082b8e7883ac05fc1d2

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Are Parliamentary Systems Better? (2009, background): “Lines of bureaucratic accountability are more complicated in a separate powers system because bureaucrats have two masters: their nominal chief executive and the controllers of the budget (Huber & Shipan, 2002; Moe & Caldwell, 1994).”
Decentralization (2012, background): “Skocpol (1995; see also Huber & Shipan, 2002) identified such a paradox with respect to the decentralization of public assistance in the United States.”
The Politicization of Regulatory Agencies: Between Partisan Influence and Formal Independence (2016, background): “This idea is basically a reversed version of the ally principle, a well-established theoretical concept within the principal-agent approach to delegation (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Huber and Shipan 2002, 2006; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001).”
When transparency and collaboration collide: The USA Open Data program (2011, background): “The article concludes with a suggestion to strengthen such practices via the erection of a formal Federal Information Marketplace (FIM).”
Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies (2010, background): “In addition, others have convincingly argued that the length of a statutory act can be interpreted as an instance of political actors ‘control’ (Huber and Shipan 2002: 44–5) rather than complexity.”
Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise (2007, background): “However, both circumstantial “revealed preference” evidence—Congress does appear to find such control tools valuable (McCubbins et al. [1987], McCubbins et al.”
Political Control and the Power of the Agent (2006, background): “But even so, the authorities can devise rules, incentives, and monitoring mechanisms that help to mitigate these problems and keep the bureaucrats more or less in line (e.g., Weingast, 1984; McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins et al., 1987).”
Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review (2005, background): “While several scholars have written on the relationship between citizens and government officials (e.g., Lupia and McCubbins 2000 and Strøm 2000), or between elected officials and bureaucrats (Huber and Shipan 2002), our argument focuses on agency problems that emerge between parties in a coalition.”