Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation

299 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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The Influence of Firm Global Supply Chains and Foreign Currency Undervaluations on US Trade Disputes (2015, result): “This argument is similar in spirit to that advanced by Bombardini 2008 who argues that industries with more large firms are more effective at lobbying.”
The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence (2017, background): “Bombardini 2008; Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth 2015; Manger 2009; Milner 1988.”
The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying (2014, background): “…absolute size of available resources, and hence firm size, so important politically is the fact that political involvement has certain fixed costs attached to it. . . " More recently, Bombardini (2008) has developed a model in which upfront costs affect firms’decisions of whether or not to lobby.”
Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization (2017, background): “Firm i maximizes its profit i by choosing the quantity to produce in each market as given in equation (2).”
Do Prices Determine Vertical Integration (2016, unknown): “…vertical integration decisions.50 Second, we control for firm size, labor productivity and industry concentration, which can affect the degree of protection through their impact on lobbying pressure (e.g. Mitra, 1999; Bombardini, 2008) and may also be correlated with firms’ ownership structures.”