Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts
By Harrison G. Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik. 2003
1,440 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/11b1cd032ebbc9d25ca661c5595ce32de614c90b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Jarrad Harford
- X. Tian
- Qiang Cheng
- Chen Lin
- George Serafeim
- Roni Michaely
- Eric C. So
- Vahap Bülent Uysal
In Finance
- Jarrad Harford
- Alok Kumar
- Roni Michaely
- Avanidhar Subrahmanyam
- Eric C. So
- George Serafeim
- Andrew C. Call
- Amy Y. Zang
Citations in the corpus
- The Informational Role of Bond Analysts (2009, background): “For example, Hong and Kubik (2003), and Ke and Yu (2006) show that equity analysts who are biased are more likely to survive, and less likely to be demoted to a smaller or less-prestigious broker. A large number of studies have documented that the distribution of equity analysts’ recommendations is ”
- Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors (2007, background): “Hong et al. (2000) find that analysts are less bold early in their careers.”
- A New Approach to Predicting Analyst Forecast Errors: Do Investors Overweight Analyst Forecasts? (2013, background): “For example, McNichols and O’Brien (1997), Lin and McNichols (1998), Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000), and Hong and Kubik (2003) find that analysts face incentives to provide optimistic forecasts and recommendations to secure lucrative investment banking relationships.”
- Analyst following along the supply chain (2011, positive): “1999) and more likely to move up to more prestigious brokerages (Hong and Kubik 2003).”
- Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism (2007, neutral): “Controlling for accuracy, Hong and Kubik (2003) find that brokerage firms are likely to reward analysts who promote stocks with ratings bolder than the consensus. Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) show that a number of bold recommendations by stars have recently been ‘‘anonymized’’ from the 199”
- The Effectiveness of Reputation as a Disciplinary Mechanism in Sell-Side Research (2009, background): “Hong and Kubik (2003) report that both accuracy and optimism positively affect analysts’ promotions from non-reputable banks to reputable banks.”