Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

By M. Bennett, P. Hacker. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 2006

1,293 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Preface. Part I: Philosophical Problems In Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots: 1. The Early Growth Of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action Of The Nervous System. Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: The Origins Of The Ventricular Doctrine. Fernel and Descartes: The Demise Of The Ventricular Doctrine. The Cortical Doctrine Of Willis and Its Aftermath. The Conception Of A Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall. Localizing Function In The Cortex: Broca, Fritz and Hitzig. The Integrative Action Of The Nervous System: Sherrington. 2. The Cortex and The Mind In The Work Of Sherrington and His Proteges. Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact. Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism. John Eccles and The 'Liaison Brain'. Wilder Penfield and The 'Highest Brain Mechanism'. 3. The Mereological Fallacy and Its Manifestation In Contemporary Neuroscientific Thought. Mereological Confusions In Cognitive Neuroscience: (Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird). Methodological Qualms: (Ullman, P. S. Churchland, Blakemore, Zeki, Young, Milner Squire and Kandel, Marr, Frisby, Sperry). On The Grounds For Ascribing Psychological Predicates To A Being: (Crick, Baars). On The Grounds For Misascribing Psychological Predicates To An Inner Entity: (Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick). The Inner: (Damasio). Introspection: (Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz). Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect: (Blakemore). Privacy Or Subjectivity: (Searle). The Meaning Of Psychological Predicates and How They Are Learnt: (Searle). Of The Mind and Its Nature: (Gazzaniga, Doty). Part II: Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: an Analysis: Preliminaries. Brain-Body Dualism: (Kandel Schwartz and Jessell, Libet). The Project: (Gazzaniga). The Category Of The Psychological: (Nagel, P. M. Churchland and P. S. Churchland). 4. Sensation and Perception. Sensation: (Searle, Libet, Geldard and Sherrick). Perception: (Ledoux, Crick). Perception As The Causation Of Sensations: Primary and Secondary Qualities: (Kandel Schwartz and Jessell, Rock). Perception As Hypothesis Formation: Helmholtz: (Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young).

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/10d4683256b63a73041fbb67662e250e6cf31d07

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

Citations in the corpus

Making enactivism even more embodied (2014, background): “In neuroscience we have the work of Berthoz (2000), 55 The Helmholtzian idea that perception involves subpersonal inferences may or may not be correct (see Bennett and Hacker 2003; Orlandi 2012; Hutto and Myin 2013).”
Aristotle on the common sense (2007, background): “The list of Bennett and Hacker (2003) corresponds to that of Kahn, to which they add function (11) listed by Sorabji.”
Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal (2011, background): “By contrast, noticing a bottle of pain-killers next to his bedside together with an empty glass of water and concluding that he has been in pain is an example of knowing indirectly or by way of inference ( Bennett and Hacker 2003, 89, 93 ).”
The interactive brain hypothesis (2012, background): “This engagement at the personal level should be conceptually distinguished from the subpersonal mechanisms involved, much in the same sense that winning a car race is not the same as having a powerful engine (see Dennett, 1969; Bennett and Hacker, 2003).”
The Human Sciences in a Biological Age (2013, background): “Bennett and the philosopher Peter Hacker (Bennett and Hacker, 2003).”
Downward causation and the neurobiology of free will (2009, background): “M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker write that “[t]he idea of me” depends on the ability to use the words “I” and “me,” and these words cannot be used correctly without acquisition of a system of words including second- and third-person pronouns (Bennett & Hacker 2003, p. 348).”
THE USES AND ABUSES OF THE PERSONAL/SUBPERSONAL DISTINCTION (2012, background): “(Hacker and Bennett 2003, 72) By the 1960s, however, psychologists were often to be found ascribing psychological predicates to parts of persons.”
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy (2017, background): “Noticing a bottle of painkillers next to his bedside together with an empty glass of water and concluding that he is in pain is an example of knowing indirectly or by way of inference (Bennett & Hacker 2003, pp. 89, 93).”
Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. (2005, background): “Thus, we have a classic dilemma of artificially delimited scientific views—in their ability to exquisitely describe a small slice of pie, investigators may be misilluminating the whole (Bennett & Hacker, 2003).”
The Brain — A Mediating Organ (2011, background): “…for motor action: If I want to write the word “apple” in a letter, 6 For an extensive critique of the representationalist concept of memory, see Bennett & Hacker 2003, pp. 154–171; Edelman & Tononi 2000, pp. 93ff. the underlying patterns of neural activity are transformed into corresponding…”