The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries: Economic Models And Human Behavior

By C. Clark. 2006

233 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1037cb46d57ee03fb64da082dfc8e0fcdbeeb92d

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Citations in the corpus

Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action Problems (2008, background): “Clark (2006) has shown that simply imposing an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) on those fishing from a coastal fishery is not a sufficient solution to the challenging problem of achieving sustainable harvests.”
Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (2010, unknown): “chhatre, ashwini and arun agrawal (2009), “tradeoffs and synergies between carbon storage and livelihood Benefits from forest commons,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(42), 17667–17670.”
A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems (2009, background): “remedy this initial failure, the government re opened the fishery but divided the coastal area into more than 50 sectors, assigned transferable quotas, and required that all ships have neutral observers onboard to record all catches (32).”
The challenge of understanding decisions in experimental studies of common pool resource governance (2011, background): “Although it generated many important general insights, it is not surprising that management efforts based on this work were often unsuccessful as the underlying models were stick-figures of real situations (Clark, 2006).”
Construction and first applications of a global cost of fishing database (2011, background): “Therefore, once the investment on vessels and gears has been made, variable cost is the only cost that fishers and vessel owners need to consider when they decide whether or not to continue fishing (Clark, 2006).”