On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement

By C. Bown. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2004

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Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders (2005, result): “A policy concern raised by this particular experience is that the lack of active participation by the other, non-Korean exporting interests at least implicitly contributed to a negotiated settlement that failed to generate positive trade liberalization benefits to other exporters (spillovers), and i”
Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes (2005, background): “There is empirical evidence, for example, suggesting that DSU participation is affected by the value of the complainant’s imports from the defendant (Bown 2004), so we include the log of this value in our regressions.”
Is the WTO Passé (2015, unknown): “See also Bown (2004a) for evidence that the outcomes of such bilateral disputes are extended to third country exporters in a manner consistent with successful application of the MFN rule.”
Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication (2009, background): “Studies of bilateral relationships also highlight the importance of bilateral trade dependence to predict dispute initiation and outcomes (Bown 2004b; Reinhardt 2000; Sattler and Bernauer 2007).”