Thinking about Consciousness
By David Papineau. 2002
317 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/100bc8b724db5d72cbd7d32571eb035b551edbb4
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- B. Veillet
- Peter Carruthers
- Katalin Balog
- Elisabeth Pacherie
- John A. Bargh
- Henk Aarts
- David F. Feldon
- Thomas K. Metzinger
In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
- B. Veillet
- Peter Carruthers
- Katalin Balog
- K. Stanovich
- Jonathan Evans
- Gary Lupyan
- Keith Frankish
- Manolo Martínez
In History and Philosophy of Science
Citations in the corpus
- The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology (2011, background): “…alike) acknowledges the crucial role that these concepts play in the explanation of explanatory gaps, inverted-experience thought-experiments, and so forth (Loar 1990; Chalmers 1996, 2007; Balog 1999; Carruthers 2000; Tye 2000; Papineau 2002; Stoljar 2005; Carruthers and Veillet 2007; Levine 2007).”
- Acquaintance and the mind-body problem (2012, background): “The dualist will say that the gap cannot be closed 38 Papineau 1993a, 2002, 2007 has an explanation he calls the “anti-pathetic fallacy” which he uses to explain what he calls the “intuition of distinctness”, that is, our intuition that physicalism cannot be right.”