Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures

By V. Acharya, Tanju Yorulmazer. 2007

360 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0f8bf9af010bd3e4a7858d6899dd4c1625ad2567

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Citations in the corpus

Securitization, Transparency, and Liquidity (2012, neutral): “This will be the case if the illiquidity of the secondary market triggers a cumulative process of defaults and premature liquidation of assets in the economy, for instance because of inefficient fire sales by banks (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008).”
Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts (2012, neutral): “The timing within period 1 is as follows: (1) the government announces a rescue scheme {  ( )}; (2) each banking entrepreneur accepts the plan if and only it makes him better off given that investors must be as well off as they would in the absence of participation in the scheme.”
Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums (2009, background): “…they do not account for the very features that create systemic risk in the first place, such as correlation among banks’ investments (Acharya 2009; Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007, 2008); the large size of some banks (O’Hara and Shaw 1990),1 which leads to “fire-sale”–related pecuniary…”
Bank Risk Taking and Liquidity Creation Following Regulatory Interventions and Capital Support (2011, neutral): “-19are the preferred option (Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008); Brown and Dinc (forthcoming)).”
The Dark Side of Bank Wholesale Funding (2010, neutral): “In particular, it assures that wholesale nanciers are not repaid in full in date 1 liquidations: WR > L(D +W ) Even more strongly, (1) implies that pWR > L(D +W ) which rules out outcomes when uninformed senior wholesale nanciers always prefer to liquidate the bank at date 1 to receive L(D +W ) ra”
Interconnectedness in the interbank market (2015, neutral): “Likewise, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) show that if banks hold stakes in the same companies (e.g. for diversification purposes) bank equities are necessarily interdependent. A second burgeoning literature on financial networks examines contractual agreements similar to our physical network construc”
Information Contagion and Bank Herding (2008, neutral): “pq pq + (1 p)(1 q) and Ps(BjHH) = (1 p)(1 q) pq + (1 p)(1 q) ; ( 3 )”
Bank Capital and Financial Stability: An Economic Trade-Off or a Faustian Bargain? (2014, background): “Acharya & Yorulmazer (2008) show that the regulator may be better off providing liquidity assistance to solvent banks to buy out failed banks, rather than bailing out failed banks.”
Interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention (2009, background): “Other papers where markets for liquidation do not work properly or are absent and some form of government intervention may improve efficiency are Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Gorton and Huang (2004, 2006), Diamond and Rajan (2005, 2008), and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008).”
Transmission channels of systemic risk and contagion in the European financial network (2015, neutral): “…network framework exhibits that excessive interconnectedness among banks and financial institutions increases systemic risk 6 and may lead to a plethora of bank failures and defaults (see also for informative reading Bae et al. 2003; Acharya and Yorulmazer 2008; Brunnermeier 2008 inter alia ).”
Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk (2017, neutral): “A similar mechanism is studied in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008b), in which the externality is that creditors rationally interpret the default of a given bank as a signal that other banks may fail in the future. In Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008a), regulation itself generates a herding behavior: when b”