Topology-independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games.

By Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc, György Szabó. Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics, 2009

404 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on different regular graphs as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions. We focus on the effects that are brought about by different group sizes of public goods games in which individuals participate, revealing that larger groups of players may induce qualitatively different behavior when approaching the deterministic limit of strategy adoption. While by pairwise interactions an intermediate uncertainty by strategy adoptions may ensure optimal conditions for the survival of cooperators at a specific graph topology, larger groups warrant this only in the vicinity of the deterministic limit independently from the underlying graph. These discrepancies are attributed to the indirect linkage of otherwise not directly connected players, which is brought about by joint memberships within the larger groups. Thus, we show that increasing the group size may introduce an effective transition of the interaction topology, and that the latter shapes the noise dependence of the evolution of cooperation in case of pairwise interactions only.

Subfields: Genetics, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0e98e86c0c52f61a1566df2c320d055b636c26ac

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Citations in the corpus

Networks beyond pairwise interactions: structure and dynamics (2020, background): “[396], and finally to assess their stability together with Lohse in Ref.”
Heterogeneous Aspirations Promote Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (2010, background): “interaction topologies lacking overlapping triangles [63,64].”
Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment (2017, background): “0 value, where cooperators can no longer survive solely due to network reciprocity and thus require additional support [58].”
Statistical physics of human cooperation (2017, background): “where K quantifies the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [166,201].”
Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game (2010, neutral): “Remarkably enough, however, individuals cooperate much more in public goods situations than expected [16].”