Private Provision of Public Goods
By P. Debaere. Social Science Research Network, 2016
1,655 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This note argues that it is hard for private institutions to provide the public goods that the government provides. In other words, there will tend to be an under provision of public goods if private institutions provided them. The explanation this note provides hinges on the very nature of what public, as opposed to private, goods are. Excerpt UVA-GEM-0144 Aug. 17, 2016 Private Provision of Public Goods Many public goods are provided by the government. This note argues that one of the reasons why the government takes on this role is that it is very hard for private institutions to provide public goods in sufficient quantity without the government's help. In other words, there would tend to be an underprovision of public goods. The explanation this note provides hinges on the very nature of what public, as opposed to private, goods are. There are different types of goods. A soft drink that you buy in a supermarket is an example of a purely private good. Because you buy the good and consume it yourself, you will benefit from the soft drink, not someone else. Therefore, consumption of the soft drink is said to be rival. Moreover, with private goods, it is relatively easy to exclude people from consuming the good, which is why the price system works well as a means of distributing private goods. By buying something, you get exclusive access to it. National defense, safe cities, clean air, and clean water are very different types of goods, however: they are public. Once the country is protected, once the streets are safe, or once the air or the water in an area is clean, everyone benefits from the security, the air, or the water, and one person's benefit does not diminish somebody else's. In other words, the consumption of a public good is nonrival. In addition, it is not trivial to exclude other people from access to security (once the country is defended), from the benefit of safe cities, or from clean water or air, which is why it is difficult to use the price mechanism to distribute public goods. Because of those two special characteristics of public goods (nonrivalness, nonexclusivity), it is not so easy to find out how much of these goods should be provided, and also at what price. It is often argued that the government should guarantee the provision of purely public goods because of those characteristics. If private institutions were to provide public goods (without government support), there would be a tendency to undersupply. . . .
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Law, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0e72848648c6a3c4330a0edfdf1342483452ec54
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Xunpeng Shi
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In Law
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Citations in the corpus
- The effects of behavioral intention on the choice to purchase energy-saving appliances in China: the role of environmental attitude, concern, and perceived psychological benefits in shaping intention (2019, background): “Traditionally, social behavior theory holds that pure altruism contributes to the personal value structure and, by extension, induces behavior in favor of the common good (Bergstrom et al. 2006).”
- Why Do People Give? Testing Pure and Impure Altruism (2014, neutral): “Andreoni (1988), Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), and Warr (1983) provide additional examples of the discrepancies between the theoretical predictions of the pure altruism model and field evidence. whether or not a crowd‐out test rejects pure altruism depends on the level of giving‐by‐others at…”
- Does female empowerment promote economic development? (2011, neutral): “…model with the utility function given by 29 That is, in the benchmark we either have wm = w f or α(i) constant, in which case the classic neutrality result in public good provision of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986) obtains. log(cg) + ∫ 1 0 log ( Ci + Ĉ ) di with the parameter Ĉ > 0.”
- The impact of climate change and the social cost of carbon (2018, background): “Unfortunately, measuring preferences is difficult (see e.g. Frederick et al., 2002) and preferences revealed through private transactions need not reflect preferences for public policy (for instance when that private transaction involves a public good; see Bergstrom et al., 1986).”
- Crowdfunding Creative Ideas: The Dynamics of Project Backers in Kickstarter (2015, positive): “Because the consumption of public goods cannot be withheld from non-contributors, free-riding is a potential issue in which contributions can be crowded-out by the prior funding decisions of others (Bergstrom, et al. 1986).”
- Nonprofit Fund-Raising in Competitive Donor Markets (2006, background): “Foundational papers such as Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) characterized nonprofit institutions as docile mechanisms for the provision of public goods.”