Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?

By Daniel W. Drezner. International Organization, 2000

290 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0e5b20762ea677d5c403031418d293fc48b4facd

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Dursun Peksen
2. S. Allen
3. Irfan Nooruddin
4. David Lektzian
5. W. H. Kaempfer
6. A. Lowenberg
7. Stuti Khemani
8. Y. Uppal

In Sociology and Political Science

1. S. Allen
2. Dursun Peksen
3. Irfan Nooruddin
4. David Lektzian

Citations in the corpus

• The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis (2003, unknown): “Particularly Drezner (2000) distinguishes if the sender country is unable to enforce the application of sanctions due to defections by private rent-seeking actors (sanctions-busting) or by nation-states (backsliding).”
• Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy (2002, background): “59 International Interactions, 28:59–75, 2002 Copyright © 2002 Taylor & Francis 0305-0629/02 $12.00 + .00”
• The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure (2005, background): “Internationally, both the prior political relations of the states ( Drezner, 1999 ) and the support other states lend to the sender state’s initiative ( Martin, 1992 ; Drezner, 2000 ) should affect sanctions outcomes.”
• When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature (2019, background): “Multilateral sanctions led by international institutions might also be less vulnerable to freeriding and defection problems among sanctioning countries than ad hoc collective sanctions (Martin 1992; Drezner 2000; Bapat and Morgan 2009).”