Secure Execution via Program Shepherding

By Vladimir Kiriansky, Derek Bruening, Saman P. Amarasinghe. USENIX Security Symposium, 2002

641 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0e2816ecef02407e166b85989e0f319760fbdeaa

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Citations in the corpus

ROPdefender: a detection tool to defend against return-oriented programming attacks (2011, methodology): “, [15, 16, 29, 55, 37]), there exists no proposal addressing Class 2 and 3.”
Binary stirring: self-randomizing instruction addresses of legacy x86 binary code (2012, methodology): “Systems such as DynInst [31] and program shepherding [35] have the potential to intercept, analyze, and modify instructions at runtime to remove or modify the locations of gadgets, if extended with some form of basic block randomization.”
Dynamic Taint Analysis for Automatic Detection, Analysis, and SignatureGeneration of Exploits on Commodity Software (2005, methodology): “[23], DynamoRio causes a bzip2 benchmark to run approximately 1.”
Countering code-injection attacks with instruction-set randomization (2003, background): “Another approach is that of program shepherding [38], where an interpreter is used to verify the source and target of any branch instruction, according to some security policy.”
LIFT: A Low-Overhead Practical Information Flow Tracking System for Detecting Security Attacks (2006, background): “Several security attack detection or prevention methods, such as program randomization [41], program shepherding [27], and statistics-based intrusion detection [21], can also be used for detecting security attacks.”
SecVisor: a tiny hypervisor to provide lifetime kernel code integrity for commodity OSes (2007, methodology): “However, such attacks can be mitigated by combining SecVisor with techniques that guarantee control flow integrity [6,14].”
Aurasium: Practical Policy Enforcement for Android Applications (2012, unknown): “Previous work [28, 40, 34] on securely executing untrusted native code provides useful directions for example, by using dynamic binary translation.”
Vigilante: end-to-end containment of internet worms (2005, background): “There is a large amount of work on host-based detection of vulnerabilities including [47, 10, 23, 21, 16, 2, 4].”
Enhancing Server Availability and Security Through Failure-Oblivious Computing (2004, background): “Program shepherding uses an efficient binary interpreter to prevent an attacker from executing injected code [39].”
Argos: an emulator for fingerprinting zero-day attacks for advertised honeypots with automatic signature generation (2006, methodology): “Similar work is presented in [42] which uses a modified version of the Dynamo dynamic optimiser.”
Baggy Bounds Checking: An Efficient and Backwards-Compatible Defense against Out-of-Bounds Errors (2009, background): “Techniques such as control-ﬂow integrity [20, 1] or taint tracking (e.g. [10, 26, 11, 35]) detect broad classes of errors, but they do not provide general protection from spatial memory errors.”
WYSINWYX: What you see is not what you eXecute (2010, methodology): “These days many applications are run in nonstandard ways, for example, in a guest virtual machine, using runtime optimization [Bala et al. 2000], or under program shepherding [Kiriansky et al. 2002].”