Persistence of corruption: some theoretical perspectives

By Ajit Mishra. 2006

169 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0df95ec0d0a4f187f3d9dc1c39467ac84831492d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Joseph L. Klesner
2. L. Lawson
3. S. Morris

In Safety Research

1. Joseph L. Klesner
2. L. Lawson
3. S. Morris

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Joseph L. Klesner
2. L. Lawson
3. S. Morris

Citations in the corpus

• The politics of anti-corruption reform in Africa* (2009, background): “corruption norm is less universal than liberal internationalists suggest (M. Collier 2002; P. Collier 2000; Hasty 2005; Mishra 2005; MunguiPippidi 2006; Olivier de Sardan 1999).”
• Corruption and Trust: Theoretical Considerations and Evidence From Mexico (2010, background): “Endnotes 1 Mishra (2006) presents a game theoretic model showing how the pervasiveness of corruption contributes to its persistence owing to people's notions of the expected behavior of others.”
• Corruption as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Costa Rica (2015, unknown): “Moreover, in a regulatory setting, corruption can undermine sanctioning (thereby fomenting greater corruption) if the frequency of illicit behavior by firms reduces the returns to skill formation by regulators (Mishra, 2006).”