Security Analysis, Agency Costs and Firm Characteristics

111 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Revisiting Agency Theory: Evidence of Board Independence and Agency Cost from Bangladesh (2015, background): “Following Doukas et al. (2000) and McKnight and Weir”
Board Structure, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: A Study of New Zealand Listed-Firms (2012, background): “On the other hand, Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) argue that blockholders have neither the time nor expertise to act as effective monitors.”
Agency theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on Problems and Perspectives (2017, background): “Though agency theory is very pragmatic and popular, it still suffers from various limitations and this has been documented by many authors like Eisenhardt (1989), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Daily et al.”
Agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence for UK firms (2008, background): “An alternative proxy for agency costs between managers and shareholders, which is not used in our paper though, is the interaction of company's growth opportunities with its free cash flow (see Doukas et al. , 2002”
Women in Top Management and Agency Costs (2011, methodology): “Past studies use this interacted variable as a proxy for agency costs (e.g., Doukas et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2009).”