Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

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Simple Adaptive Strategies: From Regret-matching To Uncoupled Dynamics (2013, methodology): “See the Handbook of Game Theory (Aumann and Hart 1994, 2002, 2004; Young and Zamir 2012).”
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information (2013, unknown): “…and Pearce (1984)), obtained via iterated elimination of strategies that are never best responses, though a better analogy may be the deductive iterations that arise in the classic “colored hats” problem with which discussions of common knowledge are often introduced (Geanakoplos, 1994, p. 1439).”
Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection (2015, background): “Ignoring technicalities, the transitivity theorem says that if C ⊆ B ⊆ A are sets of population states, if B is asymptotically stable as a subset of A, and if C is asymptotically stable as a subset 5See Benaı̈m and Weibull (2003), Roth and Sandholm (2013), and Section 2.2 below.”