Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies: Ideology, Information or Incentives?

By L. Brandt, Hongbin Li. 2003

808 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0c92961529c3933461c004e65b3ac8cb67dee745

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Citations in the corpus

Property Rights Protection and Access to Bank Loans: Evidence from Private Enterprises in China (2006, neutral): “In the absence of formal protection of private property, private entrepreneurs face the risks of expropriation as well as discrimination (see, for example, Wei and Wang, 1997; Brandt and Li, 2003; Bai, Li, Qian and Wang, 2004).”
State Ownership, Soft-Budget Constraints, and Cash Holdings: Evidence from China's Privatized Firms (2014, neutral): “Brandt and Li (2003) also provide direct evidence that private firms in China are required to provide more collateral than state-owned firms to obtain the same amount of credit.”
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in China: Symbol or Substance? (2011, neutral): “…embeddedness—its network connections within the government bureaucracy as opposed to its connections to national congresses (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007)—and (b) regional government institutional development (Brandt and Li, 2003; Goldstein, 1995) subject the firm to more governmental monitoring.”
Entrepreneurs' Gender and Financial Constraints: Evidence from International Data (2009, background): “For exam- 3Besides demographic characteristics, discrimination may be based on other factors, such as private versus public ownership of firms (Brandt and Li (2003)). ple, Bostic and Lampani (1999) report different approval rates for white-owned and black-owned firms, but no statistically…”
Cash dividend policy, corporate pyramids, and ownership structure: Evidence from China (2013, background): “Debt financing is more difficult for NSOEs because banks, which are historically state-controlled, are more biased towards lending to SOEs; and public debt markets are almost nonexistent (Gul, 1999; Brandt and Li, 2003).”
Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms (2015, background): “Given that state-owned enterprises enjoy preferential status in obtaining loans and other key inputs (Brandt and Li, 2003; Che, 2002), we control for state ownership.”
To what extent did the economic stimulus package influence bank lending and corporate investment decisions? Evidence from China (2018, background): “…that SOEs usually have advantage in obtaining bank loans and they invest less efficiently (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Brandt and Li, 2003; Cull et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009; Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011), while it is also widely documented that politically…”
China's Banking Reform: An Assessment of its Evolution and Possible Impact (2006, neutral): “For example, see Brandt and Li (2003), Chang (2003), Cull and Xu (2000), Moreno (2002), Park and Sehrt (2001), Wei and Wang (1997) and Zhou (2004). 4 The solvency ratio has also been calculated for three of the four SOCBs and ten of the twelve JSCBs.”