Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia
By Irina Slinko, Evgeny Yakovlev, E. Zhuravskaya. 2005
204 citations recorded by the source corpus.
How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms and regional regulatory capture using microlevel data on the preferential treatment of firms through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992--2000. Using these measures, we find that: (1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; (2) a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically connected firms; (3) capture adversely affects small-business growth and the tax capacity of the state; and (4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth. "oligarchy ... throws a close network of dependence relationships over all the economic and political institutions of present-day bourgeois society without exception... ." --Vladimir Lenin, "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism" (1916) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0c743033d04213596ab0240d309fc8dbdae9cfbc
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In Economics and Econometrics
- P. Bardhan
- Brian Min
- Miriam A. Golden
- Dilip Mookherjee
- L. Christiaensen
- L. Pan
- J. Faguet
- Fábio Sanchez
In Sociology and Political Science
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China (2016, unknown): “…secretaries cater to the local elites, rather than develop a genuine desire to cater to the needs of the general population, then the effect of elite influence in China sharply contrasts with the detrimental role of “elite capture” found in other contexts (e.g., Bardhan, 2002; Slinko et al., 2005).”
- State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature† (2016, background): “In general the political and institutional context and the design and implementation of decentralization vary widely across areas, 36 See, for example, Cai and Treisman (2004) and Slinko et al (2005).”
- The interaction of entrepreneurship and institutions (2010, unknown): “Slinko et al. (2005) underscore the negative effect of the establishment’s political influence, finding that large firms with high political stakes can prevent entry of new firms.”
- Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia (2013, unknown): “Some papers use this advantage in different micro- and macro-level settings (Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Slinko et al., 2005; Treisman, 1998, 2003), but the impact of strategic tax collection on fiscal decentralization has not been explored so far.”