An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business income taxes in Canada

By Masayoshi Hayashi, Robin Boadway. 2001

299 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0bdbee819341f0475f59c119b254d472ba8b8930

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Citations in the corpus

Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities (2016, background): “…allows multiple 5Other studies on tax competition include Besley and Case (1995), Besley and Smart (2007), Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2007), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Edwards and Keen (1996), Buettner (2001), Devereux et al. (2007), Hayashi and Boadway (2001), Revelli (2006), and Rork (2003).”
The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions (2002, unknown): “Boadway and Hayashi (2001) and Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2002) provide evidence that equalization has reduced business tax competition among provincial governments in Canada.”
On Spatial Public Finance Empirics (2005, background): “Fiscal competition models are typically implemented empirically by means of estimation of a fiscal reaction function, where the optimal tax rate in a jurisdiction depends on the tax rates in nearby jurisdictions (Brett and Pinkse, 2000; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Buettner, 2001; Hayashi and Boad”
Mostly pointless spatial econometrics (2012, background): “Hayashi and Boadway (2001) do not instrument at all, instead using restrictions from a theoretical model to achieve identification.”
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT CORPORATE TAX COMPETITION? (2013, background): “Therefore it is not contradictory that Boadway and Hayashi (2001) find evidence for vertical tax competition for Canadian provinces (large overlap in the tax base and significant share of taxes at the local level) while Leprince, Madiès and Paty (2007) find no vertical interaction between French…”
Do Countries Compete over Corporate Tax Rates (2008, methodology): “For example, constructed measures of the EMTR have been used elsewhere to make international comparisons of corporate income taxes (see, for example, King and Fullerton (1984), OECD (1991), Devereux and Pearson (1995), Chennells and Gri¢ th (1997), European Commission (2001)).”
International Tax Competition and Coordination (2014, unknown): “, Hayashi and Boadway (2001)].”
Tax Competition in a Fiscal Union with Decentralized Leadership (2003, background): “By implementing a Pigouviantype transfer scheme (Dahlby [13]) or even by using lump-sum transfers (Boadway and Keen [4], and Boadway et al. [5]), federal policy offsets inefficiencies in lower-level decision-making.”
Horizontal And Vertical Indirect Tax Competition : Theory And Some Evidence From The Usa (2007, background): “Hayashi and Boadway (1997) test for vertical and horizontal interaction in the setting of Canadian provincial corporate taxes. Finally, Rizzo (2003) studies the interactions between Canadian provinces (and neighboring US states) and Canadian federal taxes. However, the theoretical approach, and thus”