The Influence of Tax and Nontax Costs on Book‐Tax Reporting Differences: Public and Private Firms
By Lillian F. Mills, Kaye J. Newberry. 2001
469 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0a2415f1006c33de792bebefb45662c202cb92ad
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Michelle Hanlon
- Terry Shevlin
- Jennifer Blouin
- Edward L. Maydew
- Scott D. Dyreng
- Gordon Richardson
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Roman Lanis
In Economics and Econometrics
- Michelle Hanlon
- Terry Shevlin
- Gordon Richardson
- Jennifer Blouin
- Roman Lanis
- Edward L. Maydew
- Scott D. Dyreng
- Lillian F. Mills
Citations in the corpus
- The Persistence and Pricing of Earnings, Accruals, and Cash Flows When Firms Have Large Book-Tax Differences (2003, unknown): “Mills and Newberry (2001) report evidence consistent with the magnitude of book-tax differences being positively associated with financial reporting incentives such as prior earnings patterns, financial distress, and bonus thresholds.”
- Bridging the Reporting Gap: A Proposal for More Informative Reconciling of Book and Tax Income (2003, background): “Consistent with consolidation differences existing for foreign subsidiaries, Mills and Newberry (2000) show that average pretax book income (Schedule M-1, Lines 1 plus 2) reported on the tax return ($427 million), falls between worldwide consolidated pretax income ($483 million) and U.”
- An Empirical Examination of Corporate Tax Noncompliance (2005, background): “Mills and Newberry (2001) explain the determinants of book-tax differences.”
- Taxable Income, Future Earnings, and Equity Values (2004, background): “3 As proxies for incentives to manage earnings, Mills and Newberry (2001) use firm type (public versus private), financial leverage (proxy for debt covenants), bonus plan thresholds, and past book income.”
- Audit Fees and Book-Tax Differences (2012, unknown): “This indicates that observations where the risk of earnings management is higher have report higher audit fees, and consistent with prior 31 research (Mills and Newberry 2001; Phillips, Pincus and Rego 2003), report greater book-tax differences and deferred tax expense.”
- Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance (2015, methodology): “4 Robinson et al. (2012) measure risky tax planning using estimates of tax shelter likelihood derived from the level of activity in tax havens (Dyreng and Lindsay, 2009; Balakrishnan et al.”