Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle‐Income Presidential Democracies

By Daniel L. Nielson. 2003

191 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0980c2a052fe196ab448605ea0d866ecbc53e08d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Development

1. Bumba Mukherjee
2. Sean D. Ehrlich
3. Helen V. Milner
4. Jo Swinnen
5. Edward D. Mansfield
6. Yoram Z. Haftel

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Bumba Mukherjee
2. Sean D. Ehrlich
3. Helen V. Milner
4. Jo Swinnen
5. Edward D. Mansfield
6. E. Reinhardt
7. Yoram Z. Haftel

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Sean D. Ehrlich
2. Bumba Mukherjee
3. Helen V. Milner
4. Jo Swinnen

Citations in the corpus

• Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies (2007, background): “…most of the advanced industrial countries, which represent the entire sample in this article, have been capital rich and labor poor+ Therefore, 31+ Neilson 2003+ 32+ See, for instance, Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994; and Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997+ See Hiscox 1999, for a critique of this…”
• Democratization and Economic Globalization (2009, background): “…labor specificity, and geographic concentration of certain industries in advanced industrial democracies, affect trade protection in the form of tariffs or NTBs (Busch & Reinhardt 2000, 2005; Gowa 1988; Hiscox 2002; Mansfield & Busch 1995; McGillivray 2004; Nielson 2003; Pahre 2007; Rogowski 1987).”
• The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection (2007, unknown): “The net effect is that “as the number of parties in a given country grows, coordination over trade policy should prove more difficult, and protectionism should therefore increase” (Nielson 2003, 475).”