A Theory of Participation in Elections
By Timothy Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni. 2006
465 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/08530b147a520f3b700faf79da2c2ceb372a5269
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Stefano DellaVigna
- Ulrike Malmendier
- John A. List
- Todd Rogers
- Gautam Rao
- Thomas R. Palfrey
- Erik Snowberg
- Kyle C. Meng
In Political Science and International Relations
- Christopher T. Dawes
- T. Fujiwara
- Kyle C. Meng
- Tom Vogl
- James H. Fowler
- Todd Rogers
- A. Gerber
- Thomas R. Palfrey
In Strategy and Management
- Ulrike Malmendier
- Kyle C. Meng
- John A. List
- Thomas R. Palfrey
- James H. Fowler
- Mattia Nardotto
- David K. Levine
- Tommaso M. Valletti
Citations in the corpus
- Inferring Strategic Voting (2013, unknown): “…us to directly estimate F as a function of w.17 Note that explicitly microfounding the relationship between closeness and the fraction of strategic voters is akin to what Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) accomplishes with the relationship between closeness and turnout through rule utilitarianism.”
- Habit Formation in Voting: Evidence from Rainy Elections (2016, background): “More recent theories explore how ethics, prosociality, and social pressure may imbue the act of voting with consumption value (Harsanyi 1977; Feddersen and Sandroni 2006; Benabou and Tirole 2006; Ali and Lin 2013).”
- Voting as a Rational Choice (2007, unknown): “See Coate and Conlin (2005), Harsanyi (1955, 1969), Margolis (1981), and Feddersen and Sandroni (2002).”
- Voting to Tell Others (2014, background): “[17] Feddersen, Timothy and Alvaro Sandroni, (2006), “A Theory of Participation in Elections,” American Economic Review, 96(4), 1271-1282.”
- Overconfidence in Political Behavior (2015, background): “Group Utilitarian: In the group-utilitarian framework a citizen votes not just because voting may improve her utility, but because it will improve the utility of others like her as well (Coate and Conlin, 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006).”
- Descriptive Social Norms and Motivation to Vote: Everybody's Voting and so Should You (2009, background): “Many political experts are discouraged by how few voters they expect to vote in the upcoming elections next week.”
- Internet and Politics: Evidence from U.K. Local Elections and Local Government Policies (2015, methodology): “We use a rule of ethical voting within each group (see Coate and Conlin, 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006).”
- The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study (2007, result): “For the same reason, our data also fail to support groupspecific altruism models, and also the group-utilitarian approach of Harsanyi (1980), recently proposed as an explanation of high voter turnout by Feddersen and Sandroni (2002), and studied empirically by Coate and Conlin (2004).”
- Two Genes Predict Voter Turnout (2008, background): “Yet in spite of this social dilemma, millions of people do vote, suggesting that something other than self-interest or optimizing behavior drives their decision (Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting 2003; Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2007; Fedderson and Sandroni 2006; Fowler 2006a, 2006b; Fowler and Kam 2007;”