The Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts

By Paola Sapienza. 2002

647 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/084d163560b4e96794ac844aa9ba7a9ec479d089

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Citations in the corpus

How Bank Competition Affects Firms' Access to Finance (2012, neutral): “Several prior studies on the impact of bank mergers on SME lending ﬁnd that these ﬁrms can be hurt by mergers (see, among others, Peek and Rosengren 1996; Berger et al. 1998; Sapienza 2002; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi 2007; Degryse et al. 2011).”
Bank Financing for SMEs – Lessons from the Literature (2013, positive): “Sapienza (2002) and Berger et al. (2005) confirm this hypothesis with data for the US.”
Do Mergers Improve Information? Evidence from the Loan Market (2009, background): “(18)This result is consistent with the findings of previous research on the Italian banking industry: Sapienza (2002) finds that the typical merger leads to a rate reduction of about 40 basis points (considering a market share of the target bank of 2.”
Credit constraints and firm export: Microeconomic evidence from Italy☆ (2011, background): “These areas roughly coincide with Italian provinces (Sapienza, 2002; Guiso et al., 2003), local entities defined by the Italian law that are similar in size to U.S. counties.”
Why Do Banks Merge? (2002, neutral): “…(2.7 percentiles) confirms that there is a significant change in lending strategies and is consistent with the literature on small-business lending (Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 1998 and Sapienza 2002), which finds that large banks (possibly resulting from M&As) tend to lend to large firms.”
Consolidation and Efficiency in the Financial Sector: A Review of the International Evidence (2003, neutral): “3 See Prager and Hannan (1998) and Focarelli and Panetta (2002) for deposits and Sapienza (2002) for loans.”
Does bank competition reduce cost of credit? Cross-country evidence from Europe (2017, neutral): “In contrast, several single-country studies (Sapienza, 2002, for Italy; Kim, Kristiansen, and Vale, 2005, for Norway; and Degryse and Ongena, 2005, for Belgium) provide evidence that supports the market power hypothesis, i.e. they find a positive influence of bank concentration on loan rates.”
A Darker Side to Decentralized Banks: Market Power and Credit Rationing in SME Lending (2012, positive): “For example, Sapienza (2002) shows that small firms are less likely to borrow from banks subsequent to mergers (that tend to make them more hierarchical) relative to firms borrowing from banks that have not merged.”
Competition and regulation in the banking sector: A review of the empirical evidence on the sources of bank rents (2007, background): “For example, there are no fees on lines of credit in Italy or small loans in Belgium.”
Some Borrowers Are More Equal than Others: Bank Funding Shocks and Credit Reallocation* (2019, neutral): “…events is rarely investigated due to a lack of granular data, except in selected settings such as bank runs (Iyer et al., 2012), bank mergers and acquisitions (See, e.g., Sapienza, 2002; Focarelli and Panetta, 2003; Degryse et al., 2011) or borrower lock-in (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010).”
The Impact of Bank Consolidation on Commercial Borrower Welfare (2005, neutral): “This provides a measure of support for Sapienza’s (1999) claim that some borrowers of target banks are more likely to be “severed” after their bank merges, harming the borrowers in the process.”
The duration of bank relationships (2001, background): “In contrast to the results in Sapienza ( 1998 ) , we find that firms are less likely to end a relationship when a merger has occurred at some point in the past .”