Bargaining in Stationary Networks

By Mihai Manea. 2011

144 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient. Several new concepts—mutually estranged sets, partners, and shortage ratios—provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network. We develop a procedure to determine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players. Characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained. (JEL C78, D85)

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/073ddc8110e3cc97a06caa9bb865689761fa24c6

How researchers see this paper

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In Economics and Econometrics

1. Allan Collard-Wexler
2. Robin S. Lee
3. Gautam Gowrisankaran
4. Philipp Schmidt-Dengler
5. Martin Pesendorfer

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Allan Collard-Wexler
2. Robin S. Lee
3. Gautam Gowrisankaran

Citations in the corpus

• “Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work (2014, background): “9 Also related to our paper is a literature that examines the trade of goods in fixed networks (e.g., Corominas-Bosch 2004; Polanski 2007; Manea 2011; Elliott 2015); most of this literature rules out externalities from trades that do not involve a given buyer or seller.”