Linux security modules: general security support for the linux kernel
By Chris Wright, Crispin Cowan, Stephen Dale Smalley, James Morris, Greg Kroah-Hartman. Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems], 2002
556 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0581c13b138ce7977d437c176d6b94ea0e23ae24
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Stephen Dale Smalley
- Adam Bates
- Larry L. Peterson
- Margo I. Seltzer
- Kevin R. B. Butler
- Robert Craig
- Thomas Pasquier
- Xueyuan Han
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Adam Bates
- Thomas Moyer
- Dave (Jing) Tian
- Eddie Kohler
- Larry L. Peterson
- Margo I. Seltzer
- Andy C. Bavier
- Kevin R. B. Butler
Citations in the corpus
- Security Enhanced (SE) Android: Bringing Flexible MAC to Android (2013, methodology): “SELinux dependencies in the kernel include the Linux Security Module (LSM) framework [49], the audit subsystem, and filesystem support for extended attributes and security labels for each relevant filesystem for the device.”
- UNICORN: Runtime Provenance-Based Detector for Advanced Persistent Threats (2020, methodology): “rmal operation and that no attacks arise during this initial modeling period. The integrity of the data collection framework is central to UNICORN’s correctness. We assume that Linux Security Modules [89], which is the Linux reference monitor implementation, correctly provides reference monitor guar”
- Container-based operating system virtualization: a scalable, high-performance alternative to hypervisors (2007, background): “INTRODUCTION Operating system designers face a fundamental tension between isolating applications and enabling sharing among them to simultaneously support the illusion that each application has the physical machine to itself, yet let applications share objects (e.g., .les, pipes) with each…”
- Information flow control for standard OS abstractions (2007, methodology): “When the child calls exec in Step (6), the LSM allows access to directories (used during path lookups in the kernel) and access to the binaries and scripts needed by exec, so long as they were opened during Step (3).”
- Trustworthy Whole-System Provenance for the Linux Kernel (2015, methodology): “The LSM’s complete mediation property has been formally verified [20, 64]; in other words, there is an authorization hook prior to every security-sensitive operation.”
- PRIMA: policy-reduced integrity measurement architecture (2006, methodology): “However, the use of information flow enforced by mandatory access control in operating systems, such as the Linux Security Modules framework [23] using the SELinux module [2], can enable the isolation of key applications from such user processing.”
- GUPT: privacy preserving data analysis made easy (2012, unknown): “On Linux, the LSM framework [27] has enabled many MAC frameworks such as SELinux and AppArmor to be built.”
- Copilot - a Coprocessor-based Kernel Runtime Integrity Monitor (2004, unknown): “There have been many demonstrations of mandatory access control on the Linux kernel [6, 8, 25, 21, 27, 10]; the latest versions of the Linux kernel contains a Linux Security Modules interface specifically to support these techniques [37].”