Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

By Sonja O. Rego, Ryan J. Wilson. 2012

895 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0534f8c43ef00168711615f39bb9559f94dff366

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Citations in the corpus

Board of Director Gender and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness: An Empirical Analysis (2017, background): “The total performance-based remuneration paid to key management personnel (REM) controls for the impact of executive compensation on tax aggressiveness (Rego and Wilson 2012).”
Are Female CFOs Less Tax Aggressive? Evidence from Tax Aggressiveness (2014, positive): “…2014 1 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) view tax avoidance as a continuum of tax planning strategies that range from perfectly legal real transactions at one end (e.g., investments in tax-favored assets, such as municipal bonds) to aggressive taxavoidance practices (e.g., tax shelters) at the other end.”
Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, positive): “Rego and Wilson (2012) use both DTAX and SHELTER to capture risky tax positions.”
Tax Avoidance and Ex Ante Cost of Capital (2017, positive): “Following Rego and Wilson (2012), we calculate total booktax differences (BTD) as:”
Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Audit Pricing (2015, methodology): “We adopt the audit fee model developed by Simunic (1980) and follow prior literature (e.”
Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (2016, positive): “…and managerial determinants of tax avoidance [Badertscher et al. 2013; Brown and Drake 2013; Dyreng et al. 2010; Holms 2011; McGuire et al. 2014; Rego and Wilson 2012], our study provides evidence that firms incur real tax costs following public pressure to disclose the location of all…”
Going to Haven? Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance (2019, background): “Rego and Wilson (2012) link top executive compensation and aggressive tax avoidance.”
Is Corporate Social Responsibility Performance Associated with Tax Avoidance? (2014, neutral): “…are expected to sustain large temporary or permanent differences between their accounting and taxable income (Dyreng et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2009; Rego and Wilson 2012).17 Our first proxy measure of tax avoidance is based on total book-tax differences (BTDTOT), which reflects tax avoidance…”
Outside Directors, Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness: An Empirical Analysis (2016, methodology): “We note that interpreting the regression coefficients with respect to the SHELTER measure of tax aggressiveness is less meaningful, given that it is based on regression model estimates from prior research (Rego & Wilson, 2012).”