Separate neural definitions of visual consciousness and visual attention; a case for phenomenal awareness

By Victor A. F. Lamme. Neural Networks, 2004

317 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/052b2f34fc3770427fd6417d6ea595603f09ae8d

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Mostyn W. Jones
2. Tam Hunt

Citations in the corpus

• Seeing Red: A Study in Consciousness (2006, unknown): “For instance, Victor Lamme (2004) has taken on Ned Block's proposed distinction (e.g. Block, 1996) between 'phenomenal consciousness' and 'access consciousness' and argued that a single recurrent loop is necessary for what he calls phenomenal experience, but he has no explanation—as he acknowledges ”
• Fields or firings? Comparing the spike code and the electromagnetic field hypothesis (2023, background): “Zeki may have overlooked feedbacks from higher cortex into lower level maps (e.g., see Kawato, 1997; Lamme, 2004; Larkum, 2013).”