A NICE Way to Test OpenFlow Applications

By Marco Canini, Daniele Venzano, Peter Perešíni, Dejan Kostic, Jennifer Rexford. Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation, 2012

583 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/04b319357d6bab89ec9575f4b044d7609aa4296a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

1. Danda B. Rawat
2. Sandra Scott-Hayward
3. S. Reddy
4. Yosr Jarraya
5. Guofei Gu
6. Haopei Wang
7. M. Dhawan
8. Lei Xu

Citations in the corpus

• A Survey of Security in Software Defined Networks (2016, methodology): “NICE:NIDS [98] is an intrusion detection framework for virtual network systems.”
• Real Time Network Policy Checking Using Header Space Analysis (2013, unknown): “NICE [1] applies model checking techniques to find bugs in OpenFlow control programs.”
• A Survey on Software-Defined Network and OpenFlow: From Concept to Implementation (2014, methodology): “A more comprehensive tool called NICE [64], has generated a preliminary version [65], and can be used to analyze the codes and packet flows.”
• FloodGuard: A DoS Attack Prevention Extension in Software-Defined Networks (2015, methodology): “We modify the concolic execution engine in the NICE [11] project to implement our symbolic execution engine and use STP [17] as the path constraint solver.”
• SPHINX: Detecting Security Attacks in Software-Defined Networks (2015, methodology): “We propose SPHINX to detect both known and potentially unknown attacks on network topology and data plane forwarding originating within an SDN. SPHINX leverages the novel abstraction of flow graphs, which closely approximate the actual network operations, to enable incremental validation of all…”
• Abstractions for network update (2012, background): “A well-known (but still common!) bug occurs when programmers attempt to install new forwarding paths but lay down the elements of the path in wrong order [11].”
• A Survey and a Layered Taxonomy of Software-Defined Networking (2014, methodology): “Instead of the NICE simplified OpenFlow switch model, OFTEN builds upon NICE [138] by enabling”
• Software Defined Networking Architecture, Security and Energy Efficiency: A Survey (2017, methodology): “been proposed in [112] which is a debugging tool in OpenFlow networks that monitors the condition of the complete system frequently and determines eleven kinds of bugs such as host unreachable after moving, delayed direct path, excess flooding,”
• A security enforcement kernel for OpenFlow networks (2012, methodology): “NICE provides a model-checking framework that uses symbolic execution for automating the testing of OpenFlow applications [4].”
• Poisoning Network Visibility in Software-Defined Networks: New Attacks and Countermeasures (2015, methodology): “NICE [22] uses model checking and symbolic execution to find network software bugs in OpenFlow applications.”
• FRESCO: Modular Composable Security Services for Software-Defined Networks (2013, methodology): “NICE provides a model-checking framework that uses symbolic execution for automating the testing of OpenFlow applications [5].”
• Sdn Security: A Survey (2013, background): “Without a signi fi cant increase in focus on security, it will not be possible for SDN to support the evolving capability associated with, for example, Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [3].”